|
Bailout Watch
ETHANOL CONTINUES TO REAP SUBSIDY
WINDFALL Gloria Lee June 28, 2002
Since 1978, the
United States government has granted a multitude of tax incentives
and subsidies to promote the growth of a domestic ethanol industry1. At the beginning, the industry and its
supporters maintained that ethanol is an effective substitute for
gasoline, and promised that the fuel switch would reduce U.S.
dependence on imported oil. A successful campaign to save corn
farmers carried the ethanol market through the early 1980s. From
then on, an unlikely coalition, comprised of ethanol producers, the
corn lobby and parts of the environmental lobby, has been using
"save the environment" slogans to secure and extend the financial
giveaways2.
However, ethanol's
proponents have failed to address issues tied to the completely
artificial demand for ethanol created by huge subsidies that have
been secured with the help of both ethanol producers and corn
growers, often one and the same. Furthermore, ethanol's exalted
benefits have been refuted. Critics argue that ethanol has not
reduced U.S. dependence on foreign oil and studies conducted by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and others reveal higher
emissions of nitrogen oxides, an environmentally harmful gas that
contributes to the formation of ozone3.
A substantial
capital investment-typically between $30 million to $40 million-is
required to construct plants that convert simple sugars, primarily
from corn, into ethanol4. Approximately sixty U.S. distilleries
produce 1.8 billion gallons of ethanol yearly, mainly for use as an
additive in gasoline5. In areas with too much carbon monoxide or
ozone pollution, the Clean Air Act requires gasoline to be mixed
with ethanol or other oxygenates to reduce vehicle emissions of
volatile organic compounds. In 2000, 99.7% of fuel ethanol consumed
in the United States was in the form of blends of gasoline with up
to 10% ethanol, dubbed "gasohol" or "E10"6.
Ethanol got its
first big break with the 1978 Energy Tax Act, which allowed for a
4-cents-per-gallon exemption for ethanol fuel from federal fuel
excise taxes as a temporary measure to reduce U.S. dependence on
imported petroleum. The rate was raised to 6-cents-per-gallon during
the 1980s, but the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 reduced
the exemption to 5.4 cents of the 18.4-cents-per-gallon federal
excise tax. Since 1978, the federal Treasury on average lost $770
million in revenue every year from the partial tax exemptions
alone7. Current estimates of lost revenue now
exceed $1 billion per year. Over the past two decades, the tax
exemptions have cost American taxpayers more than $7.1 billion
dollars.
The 1998
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) extended the
costly excise tax exemption through 2007. In addition to the tax
exemptions, three income tax credits are provided for alcohol fuels
that are biomass derivatives (renewable resources) and used as fuel:
the alcohol mixtures credit, the pure alcohol fuel credit, and the
small ethanol producer's credit8. The tax exemptions have cost the Highway
Trust Fund about $10.4 billion in needed revenues9. Balances in both the highway and mass
transit accounts will be depleted between 2003 and 2015, according
to estimates by the Congressional Budget Office10.
Without ethanol
subsidies, the ethanol industry would quickly cease to exist11. Wholesale ethanol prices, before
financial incentives, are about twice that of wholesale gasoline
prices12. Without various price supports and
financial incentives for ethanol and corn crops by the federal
government, ethanol would be so expensive it would not be able to
compete with other gasoline additives.
Because corn is
the biggest input into ethanol production, Congress further augments
the cost to taxpayers by also subsidizing corn production. Corn
producers are guaranteed a minimum national average price of $1.89
per bushel13. Ethanol producers, therefore, spend a
lot of money to pay for the artificially high price of corn. To
offset the high price of producing ethanol, lawmakers then subsidize
ethanol producers to compensate them for the premium they paid. By
negatively distorting not just either the corn or ethanol markets,
but also both, these subsidies wind up costing American taxpayers
billions of dollars every year.
To a certain
extent, market inefficiencies are tolerable, or even necessary, if
there are substantial positive externalities. However, in the case
of ethanol, such benefits are either negligible, or are canceled out
by the costs involved. Each gallon of ethanol contains only
two-thirds of the energy content of gasoline14. Gasohol is also not as efficient to
burn. Says Cornell Professor David Pimentel, "The growers and
processors can't afford to burn ethanol to make ethanol. U.S.
drivers couldn't afford it either, if it weren't for government
subsidies to artificially lower the price."15
Supporters of
ethanol subsidies point to environmental benefits as the chief
reason why Americans should continue encouraging ethanol production
despite the high costs. However, evidence supporting their claims is
muddy. A report published by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) indicates that ethanol tax incentives have had little effect
on the environment, primarily because fuel ethanol makes up only
1.2% of the 125 billion gallons of gasoline Americans consume
annually16. Furthermore, without the Environment
Protection Agency's renewable oxygenate requirement, an ethanol
market really would not exist because ethanol cleans the air no
better than non-renewable oxygenates17.
Although
oxygenates have been proven to reduce some harmful emissions, they
can also lead to higher levels of others, particularly nitrogen
oxide, a precursor to ozone formation18. Blending ethanol with gasoline can also
result in more smog19. Moreover, combustion of ethanol
necessarily results in emissions of carbon dioxide, the primary
greenhouse gas20.
Subsidizing
increased use of gasohol has not reduced U.S. dependence on imported
petroleum. Ethanol accounts for 0.7% of energy consumed by the U.S.
Because the energy needed to produce ethanol is relatively equal to
the energy produced by combustion, little or no reductions in fossil
energy use follow. "Thus, if the energy used in ethanol production
is petroleum-based, ethanol would do nothing to contribute to energy
security," reports the Congressional Research Service21. Since ethanol production is so heavily
dependent on corn, any threats to corn supply or increases in corn
prices would negatively affect the cost and/or supply of ethanol22. Critics note that without significant
new domestic energy sources or reductions in fossil fuel demand,
ethanol will not lessen the country's dependence on foreign oil.
Recently, the
Senate passed an energy bill that contains a provision that would
mandate the use of ethanol in gasoline, and increase the use of
ethanol to five billion gallons by the year 2012. The Joint
Committee on Taxation has estimated that this provision will cost
taxpayers $5 billion over the next ten years.23
"A program so
bereft of public benefit as the ethanol subsidy exists only because
it has powerful friends," remarked Doug Bandow in Investor's
Business Daily24. Only five companies account for sixty
percent of ethanol production capacity25. Subsequently, the tax
incentives are effectively direct handouts to these five companies,
including mega-agribusiness player Archer Daniels Midland (ADM),
which controls 41% of the ethanol industry26. The ethanol giant, which made $1 billion
in profit in the past two decades, is a big-time political
contributor to both Republican and Democratic national parties,
donating more than $3 million in soft money since 198827. Although ADM does not maintain a lobby
office, it does help finance trade associations, such as the
National Corn Growers Association and the Corn Refiners Association,
that do lobby in favor of ethanol subsidies.28
James Bovard of
the Cato Institute commented that even if corn were to be free,
ethanol would not reap profits without subsidies29. The subsidies are a corporate bailout
for huge agribusiness conglomerates. The small ethanol producer's
tax credit is exactly that - small. Without substantial benefits and
with significant losses, it is clear that American taxpayers are
paying for Congress' shameful habits.
Gloria Lee is
an intern at TCS. She will be a sophomore at Wesleyan University in
the fall.
1.United
States General Accounting Office (GAO). Alternative Fuels:
Feasibility of Expanding the Fuel Ethanol Industry Using Surplus
Grain. June 1987. 2.James Bovard,
Archer Daniels Midland: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare. Cato
Institute. September 26, 1995. 3.Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress (CRS), "Fuel Ethanol:
Background and Public Policy Issues," February 21, 2002. 4.Omaha World-Herald, "Ethanol Plans Face Time Crush," March
19, 2002. 5.The Baltimore Sun, "Hazy Future for
Ethanol," October 20, 2001. 6.CRS, "Fuel Ethanol:
Background and Public Policy Issues," February 21, 2002. 7.St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "Midwestern Farmers Push for
Biodiesel Subsidies," August 29, 2001. 8.GAO.
Petroleum and Ethanol Fuels: Tax Incentives and Related GAO Work.
September 25, 2000. 9.CRS, "Fuel Ethanol," February
21, 2002 10.Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
Testimony, "Statement of Kim P. Crawley, Chief of Natural and
Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance," May 9, 2002. 11.Chicago
Sun-Times, "Daschle's Ethanol Bill is More Like Snake Oil," May 4,
2002. 12.Ibid. 13.The New York
Times, "Support Grows for Corn-Based Fuel Despite Critics," July 23,
2001. 14.Ibid. 15.Cornell News,
"Ethanol Fuel from Corn Faulted as 'Unsustainable Subsidized Food
Burning' in Analysis by Cornell Scientist," August 6, 2001.
16.GAO. Petroleum and Ethanol Fuels. September
25, 2000. 17.Bovard & CRS, "Alcohol Fuels Tax
Incentives and The EPA Renewable Oxygenate Requirement," October 7,
1994. 18.CRS, "Fuel Ethanol," February 21,
2002. 19.Chicago Sun-Times, "Daschle's Ethanol
Bill is More Like Snake Oil," May 4, 2002. 20.CRS, "Fuel Ethanol," February 21, 2002. 21.Ibid. 22.Ibid. 23.Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effect of
the "Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002," February 14, 2002 24.http://www.commoncause.org/publications/fuelsgold_toc.htm
25.CRS, "Fuel Ethanol," February 21,
2002. 26.The New York Times, "Support Grows for
Corn-Based Fuel Despite Critics," July 23, 2001. 27.The San Francisco Chronicle, "Senators Rap
Ethanol Mandate," April 12, 2002 &
http://www.commoncause.org/publications/fuelsgold_toc.htm 28.http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cashingin_104th/18adm.html
29.James Bovard, Archer Daniels Midland: A Case
Study in Corporate Welfare. Cato Institute. September 26, 1995.
|